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REGULATING THROUGH TRADE: THE
CONTESTATION AND RECALIBRATION
OF EU ‘DEEP AND COMPREHENSIVE’
FTAS
Billy Melo Araujo*
ABSTRACT
Contemporary international trade politics is primarily focused on
deep integration – that is, the removal of regulatory barriers to
trade. The EU, in particular, has long been one of the main
proponents of the use of trade agreements to promote regulatory
disciplines on issues such as intellectual property regulation,
procurement, services, competition and investment protection. This
so-called ‘EU regulatory agenda’ has rapidly gathered pace over
the past decade and culminated, more recently, in attempts to
conclude mega-regional trade agreements such as the EU-US
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. Such agreements
have, however, proved highly contentious and are being fiercely
contested - both because of their potential impact on the regulatory
autonomy of the EU and its Member States, and their potential
adverse effect on third countries and the multilateral trading system.
This Article discusses the evolution of the EU regulatory agenda,
the manner in which the agenda has been contested from a
constitutional and policy perspective, and the extent to which the
EU has (or has not) responded to such contestations.

* Billy Melo Araujo—Senior Lecturer at Queen’s University Belfast. This
Article reflects the law up until November 24, 2018.
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INTRODUCTION

For over a decade, the European Union (“EU”) has been
intensively negotiating and signing so-called “deep and
comprehensive free trade agreements,” (“DCFTAs”) which seek to
go beyond the removal of traditional barriers to trade and address a
variety of regulatory issues.1 This “deep”2 or “regulatory”3 trade
agenda is part of a wider global trend wherein international trade
law and policy has progressively moved away from its historical
focus in removing barriers to trade at the border, such as tariffs and
quotas (negative integration); and, is increasingly focused on the
adoption of global common regulatory frameworks and pursuit of
regulatory harmonization (“deep integration”).4 It is a trend that is
in part due to the success of the General Agreement on Trade in
Tariffs (GATT) and subsequently the World Trade Organisation
(“WTO”) in reducing tariffs, which has in turn highlighted the need
to address less visible ‘behind-the-border’ obstacles to trade which
result from regulatory divergence.5 It is also the result of
fundamental shifts in the structure of the global trading system, such
as the rising importance of trade in services and the globalization of

1

See Report from the Commission on the Implementation of Free Trade
Agreements, at 7–16, COM (2017) 654 final (Nov. 11, 2017), https://eurlex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52017DC0654&from=HU.
2
Alasdair R. Young & John Peterson, The EU and the New Trade
Politics, 13 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 795, 795–814 (2006).
3
Dirk De Bièvre, The EU Regulatory Trade Agenda and the Quest for
WTO Enforcement, 13 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 851, 858–59 (2006).
4
Jacques Pelkmans, Economic Theories of Integration Revisited, 18 J.
COMMON MKT. STUDS. 333, 349 (1980).
5
See Chad. P. Bown, Trade Policy Instruments Over Time, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF THE POL. ECON. OF INT’L TRADE 57, 58 (Lisa L. Martin ed., 2015)
(discussing the variety of instruments governments use to conduct international
trade policy); see generally Céline Carrère & Jamie De Melo, Non-Tariff
Measures: What do we Know, What Might Be Done?, 26 J. ECON. INTEGRATION
169, 169–96 (2011); Greg Anderson, Hemispheric Integration in the Post-Seattle
Era: The Promise and Problems for the FTAA, 56 INT’L J. 205, 216 (2001);
William A. Dymond & Michael M. Hart, Post-Modern Trade Policy: Reflections
on the Challenges to Multilateral Trade Negotiations After Seattle, 34 J. WORLD
TRADE 21, 21 (2000).
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supply chains.6 The EU’s current approach to DCFTAs is therefore
not something that is particularly unique to the EU; the use of FTAs
to address regulatory barriers to trade and promote market-liberal
regulatory frameworks that protect the assets and interests of firms
is a policy that has been pursued by other large trade powers7. Aside
from these economic drivers, other considerations underpin the
EU’s contemporary free trade agreements (“FTAs”). Over the
years, the EU has been at pains to stress that its trade policy is not
exclusively aimed at promoting its economic interests, but also at
disseminating its values abroad8. Trade agreements have thus been
used to export the EU’s regulatory approaches to issues such as
environmental protection, food, safety, and human and social rights.
The EU’s regulatory agenda in trade has encountered a
degree of success over the past decade. The EU has been able to
sign a number of deep and comprehensive trade agreements
(“DCTAs”) with developed and developing countries, which
include disciplines on a wide variety of regulatory issues from
intellectual property protection and technical regulations to
competition policy, procurement, and environmental protection.9
6

See Emily J. Blanchard, A Shifting Mandate: International Ownership,
Global Fragmentation, and a Case for Deeper Integration under the WTO, 14
WORLD TRADE REV. 87, 92–93 (2015) (discussion of how global fragmentation
can lead to behind-the-border policy manipulation); Richard Baldwin, WTO 2.0:
Governance of 21st Century Trade 9 REV. INT’L ORGAN. 261, 265–66 (2014)
(standing for the proposition that internationalization of production creates a new
supply-chain trade).
7
See, e.g., Alberta Sbragia, The EU, the US, and Trade Policy:
Competitive Interdependence in the Management of Globalization, 17 J. EUR.
PUB. POL’Y 368, 376 (2010); Christopher M Dent, Freer Trade, More
Regulation? Commercial Regulatory Provisions in Asia-Pacific Free Trade
Agreements, 14 COMPETITION & CHANGE 48, 48–76 (2010).
8
EUROPEAN COMM’N, TRADE FOR ALL: TOWARDS A MORE
RESPONSIBLE TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICY 22–26 (Oct. 2015),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/october/tradoc_153846.pdf
[hereinafter TRADE FOR ALL]; Communication from the Commission to the
Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Trade, Growth, and World Affairs
– Trade Policy as a Core Component of the EU’s 2020 Strategy, at 15, COM
(2010)
612
final
(Nov.
9,
2010),
https://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0612:FIN:EN:PDF.
9
For an overview, see Jacques Pelkmans, Business Dimensions of EU’s
new FTAs, 7 J. EUR. INTEGRATION 782 (2017); see also Valerie Demedts, Which
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More recently, the EU has engaged in negotiations with large trade
powers such as Canada, the US, and Japan to conclude so-called
mega-regional trade agreements.10 These countries are significant
both in terms of the markets they encompass and the type of
regulatory disciplines addressed.
However, this agenda is
increasingly contested both domestically and internationally.11
Within the EU, politicians and civil society organisations have
criticised recent trade agreements, arguing that by addressing
regulatory issues, these agreements undermine law-making
processes and reduce regulatory autonomy.12 These concerns were
reflected in a European Commission Communication published in
2015, which called for a more transparent and values-based trade
agenda.13 From a constitutional perspective, there are also
misgivings regarding the compatibility of these agreements with EU
law and, in particular, the competence of the EU to address certain
regulatory issues through such agreements. The use of trade
Future for Competition in the Global Trade System: Competition Chapters in
FTAs', 49 J. WORLD TRADE 407, 407–436 (2015); Sangeeta Khorana & Maria
Garcia, Procurement Liberalization Diffusion in EU Agreements: Signalling
Stewardship? 48 J. WORLD TRADE 481–500 (2014); Sikina Jinnah & Elisa
Morgera, Environmental Provisions in US and EU Trade Agreements: A
Comparative Analysis, REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT’L ENVTL. L. 324–39 (2013);
Stephen Woolcock, Policy Diffusion in Public Procurement: The Role of Free
Trade Agreements, 18 INT’L NEGOT. 153–73 (2013).
10
Stefanie Rosskopf, New Challenges for EU Trade Policy-making: Why
is the EU Pursuing a Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement with
Canada?, in THE EU AND THE EUROZONE CRISIS: POLICY CHALLENGES AND
STRATEGIC CHOICES 177, 216 (Finn Laursen, ed., 2016).
11
Finn Laursen & Christilla Roederer-Rynning, Introduction: The New
EU FTAs as Contentious Market Regulation 39 J. EUR. INTEGRATION 763–77
(2017); Ferdi De Ville & Gabriel Siles-Brugge, Why TTIP is a Game-Changer
and its Critics Have Point, 24 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1491, 1491–1505 (2016); see
HANDBOOK ON THE EU AND INT’L TRADE (Sangeeta Khorana & María García
eds., 2018).
12
Gabriel Siles-Brügge, Transatlantic Investor Protection as a Threat to
Democracy: The Potency and Limits of an Emotive Frame, 30 CAMBRIDGE REV.
INT’L AFF. 464, 464–88 (2018); Laurie A. Buonanno, The New Trade Deals and
the Mobilisation of Civil Society Organizations: Comparing EU and US
Responses, 39 J. EUR. INTEGRATION 795, 795–809 (2017); Christilla RoedererRynning & Morten Kallestrup, National Parliaments and the New
Contentiousness of Trade, 39 J. EUR. INTEGRATION 811, 811–25 (2017).
13
TRADE FOR ALL, supra note 8, at 20–26.
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agreements to export norms has also been criticised because it
challenges perceived notions of what the EU is and how it acts in
world politics. In accordance with the EU Treaties, the EU is bound
to carry out its trade policy in a manner that reflects foundational
values and objectives, such as the consolidation of the rule of law,
the promotion of sustainable development, and multilateral
cooperation. It is typically portrayed as a foreign policy power
which is ontologically predisposed to uphold and promote such
values. Yet, the EU’s regulatory agenda raises questions about the
EU’s commitment to such values because of its potential impact on
the ability of developing economies to adopt measures in the public
interest, and because these trade agreements are increasingly viewed
as a threat to the WTO and its centrality in rule-making14.
This Article seeks to provide a broad overview of the EU
regulatory trade agenda in recent years, how the manner in which it
has been contested by multiple actors has evolved, and to discuss
the internal and external tensions that have consequently been
exposed. Section II provides an overview of the rationale of the EU
regulatory agenda and how this policy framework has expanded
over the last decade, both in terms of the countries with which the
EU negotiates and the regulatory issues addressed in such
agreements. Section III discusses the points of tension resulting
from the EU regulatory agenda; from concerns regarding the effect
of the rules included in these agreements on national policy
autonomy, to the concerns of countries that are reluctant to carry out
the type of regulatory reforms demanded by the EU in its trade
agreements. Section IV discusses the internal tensions associated
with the regulatory trade agenda in more detail by focusing on the
issue of the EU’s competence to negotiate regulatory issues in trade
agreements and the concerns relating to the lack of democratic
accountability regarding regulatory cooperation mechanisms
included within these agreements. Section V examines the extent to
which the EU’s regulatory agenda can be squared with the
prevailing narratives surrounding the EU’s identity as an
international actor and, more generally, the EU’s commitment to
14

See Jane Kelsey, From GATS to TiSA: Pushing the Trade in Services
Regime Beyond the Limits, in 7 EUR. YEARBOOK OF INT’L ECON. LAW 119, 119–
51 (Marc Bungenberg et al., 2016); Laursen & Roederer-Rynning, supra note 11,
at 763–77; HANDBOOK ON THE EU AND INT’L TRADE, supra note 11, at 13.
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promote the multilateral trading system and carry out a trade policy
that reflexively takes account of external actors.
II. THE EU REGULATORY AGENDA
A. Promoting Rules through Trade Agreements: The Global
Europe Strategy
The EU has been a steadfast supporter of attempts to
promote deeper integration in international trade law. It was one of
the main proponents of the WTO and, in the years following its
establishment, repeatedly called for the negotiation of further WTO
rules addressing regulatory barriers to trade.15 Most notably, the EU
proposed the negotiation of multilateral agreements dealing with
investment, competition, transparency in government procurement
and trade facilitation16 at the WTO Ministerial Meeting in Singapore
in 1996. Two years later, it would also advocate the introduction of
labour and environmental protection issues within the fabric of
WTO law.17 However, these proposals were rejected by the WTO
membership, in particular (though not exclusively) developing
country WTO Members, who were keen to maintain the focus of the
negotiations on traditional market access issues of importance to
them. They were also reluctant to agree to new disciplines that
would create additional compliance costs and were perceived, in
some cases, to further circumscribe the ability of WTO Members to
adopt national policies intended to promote economic
development.18
Faced with a WTO in a state of paralysis – a paralysis which
culminated with the suspension of the Doha Development Round

15

Alasdair R. Young & John Peterson, We Care About You, But . . .’:
The Politics of EU Trade Policy and Development, CAMBRIDGE REV. INT’L AFF.
497, 509 (2013); David Allen & Michael Smith, Relations with the Rest of the
World, 46 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 165, 169 (2008).
16
See Steve Woolcock, The Singapore Issues in Cancún: A Failed
Negotiation Ploy or a Litmus Test for Global Governance?, 38 INTERECON. 249,
254 (2003).
17
De Bièvre, supra note 3, at 858–59.
18
Simon J. Evenett, Five Hypotheses Concerning the Fate of the
Singapore Issues in the Doha Round, 23 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 392, 392
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negotiations in 2007 – the EU followed other trade powers such as
the US in pursuing deep integration through bilateral trade
agreements, where their increased negotiating leverage would
enable them to impose the type of concessions and regulatory
reforms they were unable to push through at the multilateral level.
This EU regulatory agenda materialized in the form of the EU
Global Europe strategy,19 a trade policy framework devised by the
European Commission in 2007, targeting the negotiation of deep
and comprehensive trade agreements with large emerging
economies that maintained significant barriers to trade with respect
to the EU. The Global Europe Strategy represented a significant
departure from the EU’s past trade policy. In the years that preceded
it, the European Commission had focused all of its efforts on the
negotiations at the WTO Doha Development Round in the hopes of
concluding multilateral trade agreements.
The European
Commission had previously eschewed bilateral and regional trade
agreements, viewing them as a distraction. Some bilateral trade
agreements were concluded by the EU in this period, but these were
few and far between and, to a large extent, motivated by political
and security purposes. This included, for instance, trade agreements
concluded in the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy,
which covers the EU and neighbouring counties located in Eastern
Europe (e.g., Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and
Ukraine) and the Mediterranean (e.g., Algeria, Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria,
and Tunisia), and allows for a deeper level of economic integration
with the EU by promoting the adoption of the acquis
communautaire.20 The Global Europe Strategy, by contrast,

(2007); see also Kevin P. Gallagher, Understanding Developing Country
Resistance to the Doha Round, 15 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 62, 62 (2007).
19
Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European
Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of
the Regions: Global Europe Competing in the World – A Contribution to the EU’s
Growth and Jobs Strategy, COM (2006) 567 final (Oct. 4, 2006), https://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:0567:FIN:en:PDF.
20
Marise Cremona & Gabriella Meloni, The European Neighbourhood
Policy: A Framework for Modernisation? 7 (European Univ. Inst. Working Paper
No. 21, 2007), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1024102; see
Roman Petrov et al., The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement: A New Legal

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss2/2
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heralded a new era of commercially-driven EU trade agreements.21
This policy shift was in part justified by the need to play catch-up
with the US, which had been pursuing a policy of signing ambitious
and comprehensive trade agreements since the early 2000s.22 This
meant that there was a growing danger that EU firms would find
themselves discriminated against compared to their US counterparts
in terms of accessing global markets. It was also an implicit
acknowledgment that at that time, the WTO was no longer viewed
as a realistic venue for trade negotiations. The new generation of
deep and comprehensive EU trade agreements would therefore seek
to address many of the issues which the EU had failed to push
though at WTO level (public procurement, competition, other
regulatory issues and IPR enforcement), something which was
explicitly acknowledged in the Global Europe Strategy.23 These
agreements targeted the emerging economies (e.g., India, China,
Mercosur, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(“ASEAN”)), which had played a key role in opposing the EU’s
reform proposals in the WTO.
The initial record of the EU’s regulatory agenda as embodied
by the Global Europe Strategy was mixed. On the one hand, the EU
did succeed in concluding a number of trade agreements which went
significantly beyond what was then provided under WTO law. The
DCFTAs concluded with Korea, the CARIFORUM group of states,
Colombia, and Peru all include rules on issues which remain largely
unregulated at WTO level.24 In certain areas, the EU DCFTAs
Instrument of Integration Without Membership?, KYIV-MOHYLA L. & POL. J. 1,
18 (2015) (reviewing the recently concluded EU-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement).
21
Alasdair R. Young, European Trade Policy in Interesting Times, 39 J.
EUR. INTEGRATION 909, 911 (2017); Stephen Woolcock, EU Policy on
Preferential Trade Agreements in the 2000s: A Reorientation Towards
Commercial Aims, 20 EUR. L.J. 718, 718–32 (2014).
22
Charles P. Barfield, US Trade Policy: The Emergence of Regional and
Bilateral Alternatives to Multilateralism, 42 INTERECON. 236, 237 (2007);
Woolcock, supra note 21, at 721.
23
Infra, note 19, at 9.
24
ALASDAIR YOUNG & JOHN PETERSON, PAROCHIAL GLOBAL EUROPE:
21ST CENTURY TRADE POLITICS 189 (2014); RAYMOND AHEARN, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R41143, EUROPE’S PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS:
STATUS,
CONTENT,
AND
IMPLICATIONS
13–26
(2011),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41143.pdf; Maria Garcia, Fears and Strategies: The

9
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require parties to comply with plurilateral agreements negotiated
within the framework of the WTO. This is the case with respect to
public procurement25 and telecommunication services,26 where the
EU policy is to require trading partners to sign up to the WTO
Government Procurement Agreement and the General Agreement
on Trade in Services (GATS) Reference Paper on
Telecommunications. In other cases, the EU DCFTA requires
parties to comply with existing international rules and standards
developed outside of the WTO. This includes requirements to
reaffirm commitments to comply and ratify international treaties
concluded under the auspices of the World Intellectual Property
Organisation (WIPO),27 minimum labour and environmental
European Union, China and their Free Trade Agreements in East Asia, 6 J.
CONTEMP. EUR. RESEARCH 508 (2010).
25
See, e.g., Economic Partnership Agreement between the
CARIFORUM States, of the one part, and the European Community and its
Member states, of the other part, 2008 O.J. (L 289/I/3) arts. 165–82 [hereinafter
CARIFORUM-EC EPA] (outlining the importance of public procurement in trade
agreements between the European Community and various nations); Free Trade
Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part,
and the Republic of Korea, of the other part, 2011 O.J. (L 127) arts. 9.1–9.3
[hereinafter EU-Korea FTA]; Trade Agreement between the European Union and
its Member States, of the one part, and Colombia and Peru, of the other part, 2012
O.J. (L 354) arts. 172–194 [hereinafter EU-Colombia & Peru FTA]; Free Trade
Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Singapore arts. 9.1–
9.20, Oct. 15, 2018, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=961
[hereinafter EU-Singapore FTA]; Agreement between the European Union and
Japan for an Economic Partnership art. 10.1, July 17, 2018,
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1684 [hereinafter EU-Japan
EPA].
26
See, e.g., CARIFORUM-EC EPA, supra note 25, arts. 94–102
(outlining the importance of telecommunication services in trade agreements
between the European Community and various nations); EU-Korea FTA, supra
note 25, arts. 7.27–7.37; EU-Colombia & Peru FTA, supra note 25, arts. 139–50;
EU-Singapore FTA, supra note 25, arts. 8.24–8.48; Comprehensive Economic
and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, and the European
Union and its Member States, of the other part, 2017 O.J. (L 11) art. 14.1
[hereinafter CETA].
27
See, e.g., CARIFORUM-EC EPA, supra note 25, art. 143 (outlining
the importance of other provisions in trade agreements between the European
Community and various nations); EU-Colombia & Peru FTA, supra note 25, art.
196; EU-Singapore FTA, supra note 25, art. 10.4; CETA, supra note 26, art. 20.7;
EU-Japan EPA, supra note 25, art. 14.3.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss2/2
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protection standards provided for under the International Labour
Organisation,28 and a series of multilateral environmental
agreements.29 The EU DCFTA also requires the implementation of
technical standards in line with existing international standards
multilateral agreements (e.g., automotive sector).30 Finally, in some
cases the EU used its trade agreements to export its own rules. For
example, for want of existing multilateral rules, EU trade
agreements have typically replicated the text of EU Directives on
intellectual property enforcement as well as that of the EU Treaties
on competition matters such as the abuse of dominant position.31
Whilst the substance of these trade agreements reflects the
aspirations of the EU’s regulatory agenda, the EU has failed to
conclude any agreement with the largest economies identified in the
Global Europe Strategy. Negotiations with India failed because of
India’s reluctance to bind itself to high standards of intellectual,
labour and environmental protection as well as the EU’s refusal to
offer commitments on Mode 4 access (temporary movement of
service providers).32 Similarly, progress in the EU-Mercosur trade
negotiations have been painstakingly slow, with parties struggling
to reach an agreement on contentious issues such as liberalisation in
the agricultural sector.33 As for ASEAN, the EU struggled to find
28

See, e.g., EU-Korea FTA, supra note 25, art. 13.4 (discussing
multilateral labour standards and agreements); EU-Colombia & Peru FTA, supra
note 25, art. 269; EU-Singapore FTA, supra note 25, art. 12.3; EU-Japan EPA,
supra note 25, art. 16.3.
29
See, e.g., EU-Korea FTA, supra note 25, art. 13.5 (discussing
multilateral environmental agreements); EU-Colombia & Peru FTA, supra note
25, art. 270; EU-Singapore FTA, supra note 25, art. 12.6.
30
See, e.g., EU-Korea FTA, supra note 25, art. 15.3(1)(a) (discussing
work groups that are established the auspices of the Trade Committee); EU-Japan
EPA, supra note 25, at Annex 2-C.
31
See Billy A. Melo Araujo, Intellectual Property and the EU’s Deep
Trade Agenda, 16 J. INT'L ECON. L. 439, 439–74 (2013).
32
India-EU FTA negotiations likely to resume soon, ECON. TIMES, (Mar.
26,
2018,
6:18
PM),
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/india-eu-ftanegotiations-likely-to-resume-soon/articleshow/63467513.cms.
33
See Patrick Messerlin, The Mercosur-EU Preferential Trade
Agreement: A View from Europe 1, 4 (Ctr. for European Policy Studies, Working
Paper
No.
377,
2013),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2277476;
CT
Report,
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common ground between the countries composing this free trade
arrangement because of their disparate levels of economic
development, and eventually decided to negotiate agreements on an
individual basis.34 In short, the EU found that the stumbling blocks
it had encountered at WTO level were also present in the context of
bilateral negotiations with large emerging economies.
Unsurprisingly, the EU has since only successfully concluded trade
agreements with either similarly-minded economies (e.g., South
Korea, Canada, or Singapore), or small developing economies
where it can use its increased leverage to impose its agenda (e.g.,
Colombia, Peru, Ecuador and Central American states, Vietnam).
B. Global Europe Strategy 2.0: Reshaping the Rules of the Game
through Mega-Regionals
The EU’s policy with respect to negotiating DCFTAs has in
recent years significantly exceeded the initial parameters set out in
the Global Europe Strategy, both in terms of the scope of the rules
included in these agreements and in the identity of the EU’s
negotiating partners. A first significant development was the entry
into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2010, which increased the scope
of the EU’s exclusive competence in external trade matters by
providing that the Common Commercial policy would also cover
“foreign direct investment.”35 The immediate consequence of the
expansion of the EU’s external competence is that all EU DCFTAs
negotiations that were initiated in the aftermath of the Treaty of
Lisbon have included comprehensive chapters on investment

Germany wants EU-Mercosur trade agreement this year, CUSTOMS TODAY (June
7, 2017), http://www.customstoday.com.pk/germany-wants-eu-mercosur-tradeagreement-this-year/.
34
Locknie Hsu, EU-ASEAN Trade and Investment Relations with
Special Focus on Singapore, 6 EUR. Y.B. INT’L ECON. L. 233, 233–50 (2015).
35
Markus Krajewski, The Reform of the Common Commercial Policy, in
EU LAW AFTER THE TREATY OF LISBON 292–311 (Andrea Biondi et al., eds.,
2012); Siegfried Fina & Gabriel M. Lentner, The Scope of the EU's Investment
Competence after Lisbon, 14 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 419, 419–20 (2016);
Ramses A. Wessel & Tamara Takács, Constitutional Aspects of the EU’s Global
Actorness: Increased Exclusivity in Trade and Investment and the Role of the
European Parliament 28 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 103, 110 (2017).
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protection regulating both direct and indirect investments and
subject to investor-State dispute settlement mechanisms.36
The second significant development concerns the EU’s increasing
willingness to negotiate trade agreements with other large developed
economies. The EU’s decision to participate in negotiations on a
Trade in Services Agreement is indicative of this.37 The Trade in
Services Agreement is a plurilateral trade agreement focused
exclusively on services liberalisation, which is currently being
negotiated by twenty-three mostly-developed nations.38 The EU has
also engaged in important bilateral trade negotiations. First, the EU
engaged in negotiations with Canada regarding a comprehensive
economic trade agreement—the Comprehensive Economic and
Trade Agreement (“CETA”),39 which was subsequently followed by
talks of a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (“TTIP”)
with the US as well as a DCFTA with Japan. The last two
agreements were motivated both by economic and geopolitical
considerations and, in particular, the US’s decision to negotiate the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”)—an agreement which was
intended to encompass the entire Asia-Pacific region (including
countries such as Australia, Canada, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico,
Vietnam, and New Zealand)—and counter China’s growing
political and economic influence in the region.40 For the EU, the
TPP represented a challenge to the extent that it would have
effectively allowed for the discrimination of EU firms and exporters
in terms of accessing rapidly growing and lucrative markets in Asia.
36

Catharine Titi, International Investment Law and the European Union:
Towards a New Generation of International Investment Agreements, 26 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 639, 641 (2015).
37
Juan A. Marchetti & Martin Roy, The TISA Initiative: An Overview of
Market Access Issues, 48 J. WORLD TRADE 683, 684 (2014).
38
Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA), EUROPEAN COMM’N,
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/tisa/index_en.htm (last visited June 24,
2019).
39
Teresa Healy, Canadian and European Unions and the Canada–EU
CETA Negotiations, 11 GLOBALIZATIONS 59, 59 (2014).
40
See Reeve T. Bull et al., New Approaches to International Regulatory
Cooperation: The Challenge of TTIP, TPP, and Mega-Regional Trade
Agreements, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3–5 (2015); Leif Johann Eliasson &
Patricia Garcia-Duran, Why TTIP is an Unprecedented Geopolitical GameChanger, but not a Polanyian Moment, 24 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1522–33 (2017).
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The TPP was also problematic insofar as it was viewed and
presented by its proponents as an opportunity to address the type of
regulatory issues which are increasingly disruptive to global trade,
but which were unregulated at the WTO level. This would include
rules on competition, state owned enterprises, electronic commerce,
labour and environmental protection and even, to a lesser extent,
currency manipulation.41 The US, in particular, was keen to stress
the importance of the TPP as an opportunity to re-assert the US’s
hegemony in global economic governance and maintain its central
role in writing “the rules of the road.”42 The EU’s decision to kickstart bilateral talks with the US and Japan and, subsequently, with
countries such as Australia and New Zealand was therefore
informed by the need to both ensure that EU firms would not be left
at a competitive disadvantage in Asian markets and that the EU
would have a say in shaping the rules of the global trading system.
The negotiation of DCFTAs with large developed nations
would have a direct effect on the content of the EU’s DCFTAs.
Whereas developing and emerging economies have typically been
reluctant to engage in regulatory issues, countries such as the US
and Canada have historically pursued similar trade agendas to the
EU. These negotiations were therefore marked by far higher levels
of ambition in their attempts to tackle regulatory barriers compared
to those DCFTAs that had previously been concluded in the context
of the Global Europe strategy. For example, one way in which the
CETA and the TTIP departed from previous practice concerned the
inclusion of “regulatory cooperation” chapters, which established
institutional mechanisms through which parties could monitor
market access restrictions resulting from the application of domestic
regulation, and engage in dialogues to avoid or rectify such
restrictions.43 These agreements were thus dubbed by the EU as

41

Gary Hufbaur & Cathleen Cimino-Isaacs, How will TPP and TTIP
Change the WTO System?, 18 J. INT’L ECON. L. 679–96 (2015).
42
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S TRADE AGENDA 2016, at 2 (2016),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2016-Trade-Policy-Agenda.pdf.
43
See EUROPEAN COMM’N, TTIP- EU PROPOSAL FOR CHAPTER:
REGULATORY
COOPERATION
(2016),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/march/tradoc_154377.pdf.
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“living agreement[s]”44 in that they envisaged the removal of
regulatory barriers as an ongoing process.
In sum, the broad trade policy framework within which the
EU regulatory agenda is being conducted has changed in important
ways in recent years. Commercially-driven trade agreements have
gone from being seen as interim solutions to address the lack of
progress in negotiations at the WTO to occupying a central place in
the EU’s trade policy. The EU has ramped up trade negotiations
with a wide variety of countries to secure the commercial interests
of its firms abroad as well as to reinforce its normative influence in
global trade governance geo-political objectives.45 This had a
knock-on effect on the contents of the trade agreements. As the EU
engages in negotiations with like-minded countries keen on
pursuing deeper integration, the trade agreements have become
more ambitious in terms of the regulatory disciplines included
therein.
C. The Contestation of the EU’s DCFTAs
The regulation of areas which, until fairly recently remained
the exclusive remit of national parliaments within trade agreements,
has further exposed the potential of international trade regulation to
undermine national policy space and democratic accountability.
These tensions are nothing new—they are at the very root of much
of the opposition from developing countries towards attempts to
promote deep integration at either bilateral or multilateral levels.46
An apt illustration of the problems posed by deep integration can be
seen in the area of intellectual property, where requirements on
parties participating in trade agreements to maintain minimum
44

Karel De Gucht, European Trade Comm’r, Press Release,
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) – Solving the Regulatory
Puzzle (Oct. 10, 2013), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13801_en.htm.
45
Sandra Lavenex et al., EU and US Regulatory Power Under Strain?
Emerging Countries and the Limits of External Governance 22 EUR. FOREIGN
AFF. REV. 1, 1–17 (2017); John Peterson, Choosing Europe or Choosing TTIP?:
The European Union and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 21
EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 383–401 (2016).
46
See supra notes 25 & 26 (listing various multilateral and bilateral
agreements).
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standards of intellectual property rights have been severely
criticised. For developing countries, the obligation to implement
minimum standards of intellectual property (“IP”) protection within
their domestic regulatory systems means that they are no longer able
to adopt the type of policies that would allow for the copying of
products and technologies patented in developed countries in order
to promote the growth of technology-intensive domestic
industries.47 The imposition of IP rules through trade agreements is
also problematic because such agreements tend to be exclusively
focused on the protection of the economic interests of IP holders to
the detriment of conflicting interests, such as the protection of
consumer rights and human rights.48 The latter point illustrates a
key problem relating to deep integration – that democratic processes
that lead to the ratification of trade agreements are ill-suited to
address complex regulatory issues. Contrarily, while domestic
legislative proposals can be carefully scrutinised by national
parliaments and laws are the result a dialogue between the executive
and the legislative branches of power, the take-it-or-leave-it
dynamic underpinning the ratification process means that
parliaments only have the choice to ratify or reject the text of an
agreement in full.49
The emergence of mega trade agreements such as the CETA
and the TTIP and the Comprehensive TransPacific Partnership
(CPTPP)50 also create tensions at the multilateral level. These large47

CAROLYN DEERE, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT AND THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REFORM IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 316–20 (2009); Susy Frankel, Challenging Trips-Plus
Agreements: The Potential Utility of Non-Violation Disputes, 12 J. INT’L ECON.
LAW 1023–65 (2009).
48
See generally J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of
Intellectual Property Protection under the TRIPS Component of the WTO
Agreement, 29 INT’L L. 345, 382–88 (1995) (discussing the problems of
implementing IP rules through trade agreements).
49
See Marise Cremona, International Regulatory Policy and Democratic
Accountability: The EU and the ACTA, in REFLECTIONS ON THE
CONSTITUTIONALISATION OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 155, 166–67
(Marise Cremona et al. eds., 2014).
50
See Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific
Trade Partnership, GOV’T OF CAN., http://www.international.gc.ca/tradecommerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/tpp-ptp/texttexte/toc-tdm.aspx?lang=eng (last visited Apr. 16, 2019). The CPTPP (also
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scale agreements are challenging the centrality of the WTO as a rulemaking venue, in that they allow their main proponents to develop
new rules on trade which would otherwise have been rejected or, at
the very least, contested in the framework of the WTO’s unanimitybased decision-making processes. The sheer scale and importance
of the markets covered by mega-regional trade agreements means
that the rules included therein are likely to be held as global
standards. These rules are replicated in future bilateral agreements
with third countries not involved in the negotiations of megaregionals, thus relegating them to the role of rule-takers. This would
occur not only because the rules included in such agreements will
be replicated in future trade agreements, but also because the size of
the markets covered by these agreements means that any substantive
harmonization of product standards achieved through regulatory
cooperation would lead to the creation of de facto global standards.51
In this way, mega trade agreements and, in particular, the use of such
agreements to develop new rules, will lead to an increasing
marginalisation of those countries (mostly developing economies)
that are not involved in the negotiation process, and, consequently,
in the shaping of international trade law.
These challenges to democratic accountability and the global
trade governance system52 are especially relevant in relation to the
EU. Firstly, the concerns regarding the erosion of democratic
accountability and policy autonomy are heightened in the context of
the EU’s multi-level system of law-making. Since its inception, the
EU has had the exclusive competence on external trade policy
matters, including the power to negotiate trade agreements on behalf
referred to as the TPP) is an agreement concluded on 24 February 2016 by
Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru,
Singapore, the United States and Vietnam. The main proponent of the agreement,
the United States, decided to withdraw from the CPTPP in January 2017. As of
the writing of this article, the CPTPP is currently in the process of being ratified.
51
Dan Ciuriak & Harsha Vardhana Singh, Mega-regional Trade
Agreements: How Excluded Countries Can Meet the Challenge, in TPP AND
INDIA: IMPLICATIONS OF MEGA-REGIONALS FOR DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 443,
453 (Harsha Vardhana Singh ed., 2016).
52
See Eyal Benvenisti, Democracy Captured: The Mega-Regional
Agreements and the Future of Global Public Law, 23 CONSTELLATIONS 58, 58–
70 (2016) (discussing in-depth the challenges posed to democratic decisionmaking processes by recent developments in international trade law).
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of its Member States. However, the scope of such competence is
limited. As the issues addressed in trade agreements have expanded
dramatically over the course of the past decade, the right of the EU
to exclusively negotiate and sign these agreements have been
questioned. Secondly, concerns have also been raised about the
potential use of EU trade agreements to bypass internal democratic
decision-making processes. This can be achieved by using trade
agreements to regulate issues that have previously proved
problematic to legislate domestically (so-called “policy
laundering”).53 It can also occur through the establishment of
institutional mechanisms within trade agreements which could
undermine democratic processes as well as the autonomy of
domestic institutions.
As previously discussed, these tensions between the regulatory trade
agenda and regulatory autonomy are not new, but they have
increased as a result of the EU’s recently acquired willingness to
negotiate trade agreements with other trade powers which also have
their own interests and regulatory preferences to protect. The
negotiation of DCFTAs with smaller and developing economies
proved fairly uncontroversial because the EU could make use of its
significant bargaining power to impose its regulatory preferences on
others. In such agreements, the EU regulatory trade agenda
amounted to a one-way process whereby the EU would require
countries to comply to a set of rules chosen by the EU.54 Similar
agreements with large economies have proved far more
controversial because the bargaining power symmetries which
characterise these negotiations mean that the EU must also be
receptive to regulatory reform demands from its counterparts. In
other words, the advent of mega-regional trade agreements such as
the TTIP has exposed the EU to the adverse consequences that are
typically associated with deep integration, but which were, until
fairly recently, mostly felt by developing countries. Thirdly, the
EU’s regulatory trade agenda is also problematic because it raises
questions about the EU’s identity as an international actor. The EU
53

See Peter K. Yu, The Political Economy of Data Protection, 84 CHI.KENT L. REV. 777, 786–88 (2010) (explaining policy laundering).
54
See Maria Garcia & Annick Masselot, EU-Asia Free Trade
Agreements as Tools for Social Norm/Legislation Transfer, 13 ASIA-EUR. J. 241,
241–51 (2015).
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has historically portrayed itself and has been portrayed by others as
a distinct foreign policy power which seeks to shape the
international community by promoting values such as the rule of
law, democracy, human rights and the commitment to multilateral
institutions.55 The EU is also constitutionally bound to conduct its
trade policy in line with foreign policy objectives which reflect these
aforementioned values. These aims have been reflected in the EU’s
own policy statements concerning trade agreements. For instance,
a constant refrain from the European Commission is that the EU’s
DCFTAs must take into account the specific needs of the EU’s
counterparts (especially those parties that are developing countries)
and will not be used to undermine the multilateral system.56 But can
such conceptualisations of the EU’s external action be considered
valid in the area of trade, where the EU is actively seeking to sign
trade agreements which are deliberately sidestepping the WTO
decision making processes in order to promote rules that have
proven highly contentious and have been steadfastly opposed at the
multilateral level?
III. INTERNAL LEGITIMACY OF THE EU REGULATORY AGENDA
A. Opinion 2/15 and the Role of National Parliaments in the EU
Trade Agreements
The exclusivity of the EU’s competence in the area of
external trade is well established. It was confirmed by the European
Court of Justice in its Opinion 1/7557 as an indispensable tool to
achieve a fully integrated internal market. Indeed, Member States
55

See Owen Parker & Ben Rosamund, Normative Power Europe’ Meets
Economic Liberalism: Complicating Cosmopolitanism Inside/Outside the EU, 48
COOPERATION & CONFLICT 229, 223 (2013); Ian Manners, The European Union
as a Normative Power: A Response to Thomas Diez, 35 J. IN’TL STUD. 167, 170
(2006); Jan Orbie, Civilian Power Europe: Review of the Original and Current
Debates, 41 COOPERATION & CONFLICT 123, 123 (2006); Helene Sjursen, The EU
as a ‘Normative’ Power: How can this Be?, 13 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 235, 236
(2006).
56
EU-Korea FTA, supra note 25, art. 13.4.
57
See Opinion 1/75, Understanding on a Local Cost Standard, 1975
E.C.R. 1356 (noting the holding which established external trading is an integral
tool for an international market).
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would be able to distort competition within the internal market if
they were allowed to conduct their own individual trade policies
and, for example, apply different tariff and non-tariff barriers with
respect to non-EU imports.58 The ability of the EU to speak with
one voice in trade matters also made sense from a policy
perspective, in that it enabled the EU to make more effective use of
its considerable market power in trade negotiations.59
The scope of this exclusive competence has long been the
subject of much debate and change—in large part because the policy
areas that are encompassed by international trade law and politics
are constantly evolving and expanding. When the Treaty of Rome
was signed back in 1957, the Common Commercial Policy (the term
used under the EU Treaties to refer to the EU’s external trade policy)
was described as aiming “to contribute . . . to the harmonious
development of world trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions
on international trade and the lowering of customs barriers.”60 No
mention was made as to the type of international economic
exchanges covered by the Common Commercial Policy—this
would have been irrelevant at the time, because global commerce
was largely dominated by trade in goods, and international trade law
focused the removal of tariffs. But as international economic
exchanges diversified and trade policy progressively shifted its
focus towards non-tariff barriers, the EU was also forced to widen,
through a succession of Treaty reforms, the remit of its trade policy
to cover areas such as services, commercial aspects of intellectual
property61 and, more recently, foreign direct investment.62
The Treaty reforms have nevertheless continued to struggle
to keep up with the ever-expanding scope of international trade
58

Id. at 1364.
See SOPHIE MEUNIER, TRADING VOICES: THE EUROPEAN UNION IN
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL NEGOTIATIONS 21–40 (2005) (noting the
European Union’s market power in trade negotiations).
60
Consolidated Treaty on European Union, 2012 O.J. (C 202/01), art.
206.
61
Christoph W. Herrmann, Common Commercial Policy After Nice:
Sisyphus Would Have Done a Better Job, 39 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 7, 7–29
(2002); Horst Günter Krenzler & Christian Pitschas, Progress or Stagnation?:
The Common Commercial Policy After Nice, 6 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 291,
291–92 (2001).
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Messerlin, supra note 33, at 1–2.
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politics, as reflected in the content of the new generation of EU’s
DCFTAS. The question of whether the provisions included in the
first EU trade agreement concluded in the aftermath of the Treaty of
Libson—the EU-Singapore DCFTA—fell within the EU’s
exclusive competence or whether they would fall within the EU’s
shared competence was thus put to the European Court of Justice.
The answer to that question was of importance in that it
would provide clarity to the decision-making process that would
underpin the conclusion and ratification of EU’s DCFTAs and,
specifically, the role to be played by national parliaments of EU
Member States in this process. Should the DCFTAs be deemed to
fall within the scope of the EU’s exclusive competence, such
agreements could be concluded by a decision of the Council of
Ministers after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.
An agreement that would fall under the shared competence of both
the EU and Member States—that is, a “mixed” agreement—would
likely have to be signed and ratified by each one of the EU’s 28
Member States as well as subnational entities which retain foreign
policy power in accordance with national constitutions.63
To the extent that modern trade negotiations are already very
complex and time-consuming affairs, giving a right of veto to
national parliaments could discredit the EU as a credible and reliable
trade negotiator. For a while, this issue remained one of limited
practical relevance. For example, all trade agreements concluded
by the EU, since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2010,
have been negotiated as mixed agreements.64 The vast majority of
these agreements were concluded and ratified without significant
hiccups. However, the problem was thrown into sharp relief in the
context of the CETA, which was signed as a mixed agreement,
allowing the Walloon government—a Belgian federal region—to
63

See generally David Kleimann & Gesa Kübek, The Signing,
Provisional Application, and Conclusion of Trade and Investment Agreements in
the EU: The Case of CETA and Opinion 2/15, 45 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON.
INTEGRATION 13, 13–45 (2018) (discussing the attempt of Wallonian regional
government to block the signature of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade
Agreement).
64
Guillaume Van der Loo, Less is More? The Role of National
Parliaments in the Conclusion of Mixed (Trade) Agreements, CTR. FOR THE L. OF
EU EXTERNAL REL. 4, 32 (2018), https://www.asser.nl/media/4164/cleer01801_proof-01.pdf.
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block the approval of the agreement unless the agreement was
amended to reflect its multiple concerns.65 Although the Walloon
stand-off was eventually resolved and the agreement was signed, it
served to illustrate how difficult it would be for the EU to conclude
comprehensive deep trade agreements if these were considered to
cover both issues of exclusive and shared competence. If the EU is,
practically speaking, incapable of negotiating such agreements, then
it would be left on the outside looking in to major future trade
agreements and would no longer be able to play a part in shaping
the rules of international trade.
The other side of this debate is that the EU’s exclusive
competence in trade matters arguably reduces the democratic
legitimacy of EU’s DCFTAs as it excludes national parliaments
from the decision-making process. This point was potently made in
the 2006 ‘Namur Declaration,’ a document signed by a variety of
politicians and scholars which called for, amongst other things, an
enhancement of democratic parliamentary control procedures
surrounding the negotiation of EU’s DCFTAs.66 The proposals
include the establishment of mechanisms through which the
potential effects of DCFTAs can be analysed and contested, prior to
the setting of a negotiating mandate and the systematic release of
interim results of negotiations allowing for parliamentary debate
prior to the closing of negotiations.67

65

David A. Gantz, The CETA Ratification Saga: The Demise of ISDS in
EU Trade Agreements?, (Ariz. Legal Stud. Discussion Paper No. 17-10 (2017));
Guillaume Van Der Loo & Jacques Pelkmans, Commentary, Does Wallonia’s
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(Oct.
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2016),
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In its Opinion 2/15,68 the Court finally delivered its findings
on the scope of the EU’s exclusive competence to conclude the EUSingapore DCFTA. Whilst the Court confirmed that the vast
majority of fields covered in the EU-Singapore DCFTA fell within
the EU’s exclusive competence, it also ruled that two key
components of the contemporary EU’s DCFTAs—foreign indirect
investment and the investor-state-dispute settlement mechanism—
was considered to be a shared competence between the EU and its
member States.69
At first sight this would appear to be a positive result for
those arguing meaningful democratic scrutiny and control over EU’s
DCFTAs. Indeed, the Opinion means that, in their current
incarnation, EU’s DCFTAs would still have to be ratified by
national parliaments of EU Member States.
However, by
confirming that the vast majority of provisions included in these
agreements fell under the exclusive competence of the EU, the Court
opened the possibility for the EU to consider moving away from its
practice of concluding EU’s DCFTAs as mixed agreements and
instead signing them as EU-only trade agreements.70 This approach,
which has been endorsed by the Council,71 would entail negotiating
portfolio investment and investor state dispute settlement (“ISDS”)
in agreements that are distinct from EU’s DCFTAs. The former
would be subject to Member State ratification whilst the others
could be concluded under the article 218 Treaty on European Union
(“TEU”) procedure.
At this stage, it remains unclear whether the EU intends to
systematically carve out portfolio investment and ISDS from its
DCFTAs to ensure these fall under its exclusive competence. But if
this approach was to be followed, it would inevitably lead to the
further distancing of national parliaments from the EU’s trade
68
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policy. Parliamentary oversight would still be ensured via the
European Parliament, which retains the right to veto trade
agreements—and has done so in the past—and has a significant role
to play in scrutinising trade negotiations. However, a move away
from mixed agreements and the resulting removal of national
parliaments in the process of ratifying trade agreements may prove
problematic in an environment where EU’s DCFTAs have become
increasingly politicised and controversial at the national level.72
In the “Brussels Declaration”73—a document authored by
the chairman of the European Parliament's Committee on
International Trade and co-signed by a number of academics—such
concerns were acknowledged. The document proposed the
additional engagement of EU Member States and their national and
regional parliaments on trade negotiations and an increase in the
levels of transparency in trade negotiations. This would be achieved
by adopting a policy of automatically transmitting negotiating
directives for trade agreements and publishing such
recommendations to allow national parliaments and other domestic
stakeholders to put forward their observations to their
governments.74
Such increase in transparency during trade negotiations
would enable national parliaments to carry out some degree of
scrutiny. The scrutiny would, however, remain limited. Firstly, the
negotiating drafts published by the EU tend to be the EU’s draft
proposals and, typically, do not incorporate the counterparty’s
counter-proposals unless the counterparty in negotiations agrees to
their release. The more contentious aspects of negotiations can, of
course, be made available to national parliaments by national
governments.
Indeed, a number of Member States have put in place
procedures which enable national governments to inform and
consult with national parliaments on the progress of EU trade

72

See Jan Wouters & Kolja Raube, Rebels with a Cause? Parliaments
and EU Trade Policy After the Treaty of Lisbon 10–11, 14 (Leuven Ctr. for Glob.
Governance Studies & the Inst. for Int’l Law, Working Paper No. 194, 2017),
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negotiations on a regular basis.75 However, relying on Member
States to consult with national parliament is far from optimal in
terms of ensuring democratic legitimacy of EU’s DCFTAs. It
means that the level of parliamentary scrutiny over agreements will
vary from one Member State to another depending on whether a
Member state allows for such consultation, and on the level of
information national executives opt to share with parliament. To
rectify this, it could be worth considering standardising the
consultation mechanisms at the EU level. For example, one could
envisage the establishment of a system of inter-parliamentary
cooperation that would require the European Parliament to meet
national parliament representatives on a regular basis. This would
ensure that all national parliaments have access to the same level of
information and would give them an opportunity to submit their
observations and concerns to the European Parliament.
B. Regulatory Cooperation in Trade Agreements
An important addition to the EU’s most recent DCFTAs is
the inclusion of regulatory cooperation chapters that establish
administrative governance systems which allow for information
exchange between regulatory authorities and promote regulatory
dialogue in order to address the trade disruptive effects of domestic
regulation.76 These systems reflect a wider trend in global economic
governance, whereby the need to address complex regulatory issues
means that traditional forms of international cooperation based on
state-led negotiations and judicial dispute settlement mechanisms
are being complemented by less formal, process-based methods of
international cooperation.77 Efforts to develop disciplines on market
75
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See generally Debra P. Steger, Institutions for Regulatory Cooperation
in ‘New Generation’ Economic and Trade Agreements, 39 LEGAL ISSUES OF
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141–166 (Susy Frankel & Meredith Kolsky Lewis eds., 2014).
77
KERN ALEXANDER ET AL., GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF FINANCIAL
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regulation at the international level are increasingly being carried
out in the context of “transnational systems of . . . regulatory
cooperation have been . . . established through international treaties
and more informal intragovernmental networks of cooperation[.]” 78
This includes specialized bodies and committees established by
international organizations in order to administer and implement
international agreements, transnational networks of national
regulatory authorities, international standard-setting bodies and
hybrid public-private organizations.79 The CETA was the first in
the new generation of commercially-driven deep FTAs concluded
by the EU to include a horizontal regulatory cooperation chapter.
This chapter creates a Regulatory Cooperation Forum entrusted with
the task of monitoring a series of voluntary regulatory cooperation
activities, from discussing “regulatory policy issues of mutual
interest”80 to reviewing regulatory initiatives that are deemed to
“provide potential for cooperation.”81 The EU has also proposed the
negotiation of a horizontal regulatory cooperation chapter in the
TTIP, which would go significantly further than the CETA.82 It
includes obligations relating to the adoption of good regulatory
practices (e.g., publication of regulatory agendas and sharing of ex
ante and ex post analyses) and the establishment of bodies through
which the exchange of information on regulatory activity can occur.
These bodies would also be entrusted with the task of assessing
areas where mutual recognition, or regulatory compatibility could
be achieved.83 This regulatory chapter also provides for the
The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and
the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 53-55 (2002); Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Disaggregated Sovereignty: Towards the Public Accountability of
Global Government Networks, 39 GOV’T & OPP. 159, 162 (2004).
78
Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative
Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 16 (2005).
79
Id.
80
CETA, supra note 26, art. 21.6(2)(a).
81
Id. art. 21.6(2)(c).
82
Peter Chase & Jacques Pelkmans, This Time it's Different: TurboCharging Regulatory Cooperation in TTIP (Ctr. for European Policy Studies,
Special
Report
No.
110,
2015),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2614348.
83
For in-depth analyses of the TTIP regulatory cooperation chapter see
Alberto Alemanno, The Regulatory Cooperation Chapter of the Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership: Institutional Structures and Democratic
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establishment of a Regulatory Cooperation Body (“RCB”) in the
TTIP, which would have the task of monitoring all regulatory
cooperation carried out within the framework of the agreement. The
RCB would, for example, monitor implementation of the provisions
of the regulatory cooperation chapter, discuss and propose new
initiatives for regulatory cooperation, prepare joint initiatives for
international regulatory instruments, and ensure transparency of
regulatory cooperation between parties.84 The RCB would be
composed of trade officials and representatives of regulatory
authorities from both parties, who would work alongside ad hoc
working groups, focusing on sector-specific regulatory issues in
areas such as chemicals, cosmetics, engineering, medical devices,
car safety standards and services.85
The purpose of the regulatory cooperation mechanism
proposed for the TTIP is to create a “living agreement” through
which the parties can tackle regulatory trade barriers on a continual
basis.86 The hope is that in time, the institutional and cooperation
frameworks established by the agreement will foster the type of
mutual trust and long-term regulatory dialogue that is a prerequisite
of regulatory convergence.87 The introduction of strong regulatory
cooperation mechanisms within EU trade agreements have been
described by some as representing a paradigm shift away from
classic free trade agreements and towards “transformative trade
agreements”88 which view deep market integration as an ongoing
and open-ended process. That regulatory cooperation should be
pursued in these agreements is logical since the EU, the US, and
Consequences, 18 J. INT’L ECON. L. 625, 640 (2015); see also Jonathan B. Wiener
& Alberto Alemanno, The Future of International Regulatory Cooperation: TTIP
as a Learning Process Toward a Global Policy Laboratory, 78 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 103, 134 (2015).
84
See EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 43.
85
EUROPEAN COMM’N, TTIP AND REGULATION: AN OVERVIEW (Feb. 10,
2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/february/tradoc_153121.pdf.
86
De Gucht, supra note 44.
87
Ioannis Lianos & Johannes Le Blanc, The ‘Trust’ Theory of
Integration, in 15 REGULATING TRADE IN SERVICES IN THE EU AND THE WTO,
17, 46–52 (Ioannis Lianos & Okeoghene Odudu eds., 2012).
88
Hanns Ullrich, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(TTIP): Extending Trade Policy to Domestic Markets, 30 REVENUE
INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT ÉCONOMIQUE [INT’L J. ECON. LAW] 421, 451 (2016).
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Canada have historically pursued similar trade agendas and have
broadly similar regulatory preferences. This is consistent with the
idea that regulatory cooperation between advanced economies is
beneficial, not just because countries stand to gain more from the
removal of regulatory barriers, but because increased interaction
between sophisticated regulatory systems can have a positive effect
on regulatory outcomes. The argument is that, when faced with
better regulatory processes, countries will be induced to “improve
[their] own regulations in order to face the challenges raised by the
partner’s better regulations[.]”89 In this sense, it has been contended
that the regulatory cooperation mechanisms envisaged in the TTIP
could serve as a “transatlantic policy laboratory,”90 enabling parties
to learn from each other’s regulatory divergences and experiences
and to develop better regulatory approaches.
A number of concerns have been voiced in relation to the
potential impact of these mechanisms on the regulatory autonomy
and democratic processes of the parties involved. In some respects,
these concerns have been overplayed. First, because there is no legal
obligation in these agreements for the parties to actively pursue
regulatory cooperation,91 the parties retain the right to decide
whether or not to make use of these mechanisms. Second, from a
constitutional perspective, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has
previously ruled that the European Commission’s right of initiative
with respect to legislative proposals would not be undermined by
the existence of similar international regulatory cooperation
mechanisms.92 It is worth noting that past attempts at EU-US
regulatory cooperation (promoting mutual recognition arrangements
for product standards) have had very limited success, because the
voluntary nature of the mechanisms meant that parties often opted
against pursuing regulatory cooperation.93 The same applies to the
89

Patrick A. Messerlin, The Much Needed EU Pivoting to East Asia, 10
ASIA-PACIFIC EU STUD. 1, 6 (2012).
90
Wiener & Alemanno, supra note 83, at 134.
91
CETA, supra note 26, art 21.2(2); see EUROPEAN COMM’N, TTIP –
INITIAL PROVISIONS FOR CHAPTER [ ] - REGULATORY COOPERATION (2015),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/april/tradoc_153403.pdf
92
Case C-233/02, French Republic v. Comm’n of the European Cmtys.,
2004 E.C.R. I-2759.
93
John Peterson & Alasdair R. Young, Trade and Transatlantic
Relations: Old Dogs and New Tricks, in 8 MAKING HISTORY: EUROPEAN
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voluntary cooperation frameworks envisaged in the CETA and the
TTIP.94 That such mechanisms may, in practice, influence the
Commission’s decision to introduce or even affect the content of
proposals was not viewed as a restriction of the right of initiative,
but rather as an exercise of this right.95 In any event, it is difficult to
imagine how deliberation between officials in the RCB could lead
to substantive changes in the domestic laws of the parties. Any
proposed changes to the law would still have to go through the
applicable decision-making processes and be subject to
parliamentary scrutiny.96
These considerations should not, however, distract from the
fact that these mechanisms ultimately seek to affect the content of
and the decision-making processes underpinning domestic market
regulation of the parties involved. This is in part due to the fact that
these mechanisms have been devised in the wider framework of
trade agreements and are therefore primarily geared towards
addressing domestic rules from a trade liberalizing perspective—
that is, that the overriding objective of the cooperation is to remove
trade distorting effects of domestic regulation. This presents the
danger that domestic regulators participating in regulatory
cooperation will be incentivized to place trade and investment
considerations above non-economic considerations.97 For example,
INTEGRATION AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AT FIFTY 283, 291 (Sophie Meunier
& Kathleen McNamara eds., 2007); Bernard Hoekman, Fostering Transatlantic
Regulatory Cooperation and Gradual Multilateralization 18 J. INT’L ECON. L.
609, 612 (2015); Stephen Woolcock et al., The Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership: Challenges and Opportunities for Consumer Protection
(Ctr. for European Policy Studies, Special Report No. 112, 2015),
http://aei.pitt.edu/66136/1/SR_No_115_Woolcock_et_al_TTIP_Consumer_Prot
ection.pdf.
94
Van der Loo & Pelkmans, supra note 65.
95
See Anne Meuwese, Constitutional Aspects of Regulatory Coherence
in TTIP: An EU Perspective, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153, 167 (2015)
(noting the Commission enjoys the exclusive right of initiative in the legislative
context at the EU level).
96
CHRISTIANE GERSTETTER, REGULATORY COOPERATION UNDER TTIP
– A RISK FOR DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL REGULATION? 5 (Sept. 2014),
https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/ttip_study_regulatory_cooperation_under
_ttip_1.pdf.
97
Ferdi De Ville & Gabriel Siles-Brugge, Why TTIP is a Game Changer
and its Critics have a Point, J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1490, 1500 (2016).
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it has been argued that the proposed requirement to conduct impact
assessments for planned regulation focuses exclusively on the
potential impact of the regulation on international trade and
investment. Moreover, the requirement on regulatory authorities to
communicate proposed legislation to each other places them in a
position where they will be drafting legislation with an external
audience in mind.98 Concerns have also been raised that past
regulatory cooperation mechanisms focused on standard-setting
tended to be ripe for regulatory capture99 and favoured business and
industry interests over those of civil society stakeholders with fewer
resources.100 In short, there are a number of features of regulatory
cooperation which could potentially create a pro-liberalizing and deregulatory dynamic in domestic law-making processes.
The regulatory cooperation components of the EU’s recent
trade agreements present the EU with a very particular challenge.
With the increasing focus on regulatory barriers, it was inevitable
that deep integration efforts would seek to develop soft law
mechanisms allowing for continual regulatory dialogue and
oversight, especially between like-minded countries sharing
similarities in their approach to market regulation. There are
concerns that regulatory cooperation will “undercut public
deliberation and remove regulatory governance further from
democratic oversight,”101 which are overblown. Regulatory
cooperation of the type pursued in the CETA and (possibly) in the
TTIP is not solely about removing regulatory divergences, it is also
98

See Fabian Bohnenberger & Christian Joerges, From Trade
Liberalisation to Transnational Governance and TTIP: How Dani Rodrik, Karl
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of Globalization, 44 TRANSNAT’L INST. 1, 16 (2016) (discussing the fundamental
tensions between economic globalization and democratic politics in the field of
international trade governance).
99
See generally Richard W. Parker, Four Challenges for TTIP
Regulatory Cooperation, 22 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 1 (2015) (discussing the
challenges of the trade agreement TTIP between the EU and the US).
100
See Marija Bartl, Regulatory Convergence Through the Backdoor:
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GERMAN L.J. 970 (2017) (discussing the EU’s obligation to uphold and promote
its value and interest in its external policies); Thomas. J. Bollyky & Petros. C.
Mavroidis, Trade, Social Preferences and Regulatory Cooperation: The New
WTO-Think, 20 J. INT’L ECON. L. 1, 18 (2016).
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about creating fora which foster regulatory trust between countries
by encouraging information exchange and allowing authorities to
explain the rationale for certain trade disruptive regulations.102 Even
where there is scope for regulatory convergence or equivalence,
these cannot be pursued without going through the applicable
domestic decision making processes. Finally, past experience
suggests that, even between like-minded countries, regulatory
cooperation mechanisms included in DCFTAs tend achieve very
little103—a striking example of this being the relatively modest
outcomes realized by previously established regulatory cooperation
frameworks between the EU and the US.104
Still, there are legitimate concerns that must be addressed in
order to ensure that regulatory cooperation mechanisms do not
influence regulatory processes in a manner which exclusively
favours trade liberalization goals over other equally legitimate nontrade goals. In this respect, further clarity is required on two points.
It is important that regulatory cooperation in trade agreements is not
dominated by trade negotiators, but that it also includes regulators
that understand and are able to take into account non-trade
regulatory preferences. By the same token, whilst the regulatory
cooperation bodies included in EU trade agreements allow for the
consultation of stakeholders, more thought must be given to creating
safeguards to ensure that all interests are given an equal voice and
representation, so that no single group is able to capture the
process.105
IV. EXTERNAL LEGITIMACY OF THE EU REGULATORY AGENDA
A. Regulatory Agenda as an Expression of the EU’s Foreign
Policy Power
The manner in which the EU has pursued its regulatory
agenda has raised questions about the EU’s role as a trade power
102

Id. at 27.
Steger, supra note 76, at 124–25.
104
See RAYMOND J. AHEARN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34717,
TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION: BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS 15
(2009), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34717.pdf.
105
See Steger, supra note 76, at 124–25; see generally Evenett, supra
note 18.
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and, in particular, the impact that the EU’s current emphasis on the
negotiation of DCFTAs has on external actors and the multilateral
trading system more generally.106 These questions are relevant
because they strike at the heart of the debate concerning EU’s
identity as an international actor and, specifically, the notion of the
EU as a distinct actor which seeks to influence the international
community through the diffusion of norms rather than through
coercive means. This is best embodied by the notion of the EU as a
Normative Power, developed by Ian Manners to capture the EU’s
supposedly qualitatively distinct international identity in
international relations.107 The conceptual basis of Normative Power
Europe is that the EU is predisposed to act in a normative way in
international politics because it is itself a normative construct.108 It
is in effect a narrative of self-projection where the EU seeks to shape
the international community in its image by projecting constitutional
norms such as principles of democracy, rule of law, social justice
and respect for human rights.109 A second major component of
Normative Power Europe relates to the process employed by the EU
to promote its norms. According to Ian Manners, a normative power
must not only promote norms but also act in a normative manner
when doing so.110 This entails an obligation to ensure consistency
and coherence between the EU’s internal and external norms, and to
promote norms through cooperation and dialogue rather than
through coercive means and to reflexively take into account the
106

See generally Gabriel Siles-Brügge, EU Trade and Development
Policy Beyond the ACP: Subordinating Developmental to Commercial
Imperatives in the Reform of GSP, 20 CONTEMP. POL. 49 (2014) (discussing the
centrepiece of the European Union's (EU's) trade and development strategy as the
reform of the Generalised System of Preferences); Jan Orbie & Sangeeta Khorana,
Normative Versus Market Power Europe? The EU-India Trade Agreement, 13
ASIA-EUR. J. 253, 253–64 (2015); John Peterson, Choosing Europe or Choosing
TTIP?: The European Union and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership, 21 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 383, 401 (2016).
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effect of the promotion of norms on third countries.111 A normative
foreign policy, therefore, entails the pursuit of normative goals
through normative means—that is, one that is “justifie[d] . . . by
making reference to its milieu goals that aim to strengthen
international law and institutions and promote the rights and duties
enshrined and specified in international [law].”112
The salience of Normative Power Europe as a
conceptualisation of the EU’s identity in international relations is
such that it was eventually integrated into the constitutional fabric
of the EU, as the EU Treaties themselves establish a constitutional
obligation on the EU to ensure that its external action is guided by a
series of principles, values, and objectives.113 Article 2 of the TEU
states that that the EU’s external action must uphold values such as
the “respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the
rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of
persons belonging to minorities.”
The provision is then
complemented by article 21 TEU which requires the EU to develop
policies and cooperate to, inter alia, “safeguard its values . . .
consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights .
. . improve the quality of the environment and the sustainable
management of global natural resources and promote an
international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and
good global governance.” Article 207 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TEFU) confirms that the EU’s
external trade policy must be conducted in the context of the
principles and objectives of the EU’s external action—something
which was confirmed in Opinion 2/15, where the Court ruled that
foreign policy objectives such as sustainable development form “an
integral part of the common commercial policy.”114 The limited
case law on these foreign policy values and objectives means that
their normative value is still a subject of academic debate. Some
111
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113
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have argued that these are justiciable norms with scope for
enforceability,115 whilst others view them primarily as Treaty
interpretation tools.116 Nevertheless, the very existence of these
constitutionally-recognised objectives reinforces the idea of the EU
as an international actor that is predisposed to project its values and
norms abroad.
There are, however, other conceptualisations of the EU as an
international actor, which contest the assumptions underpinning
“Normative Power Europe.” Chad Damro’s idea of a “Market
Power Europe,” which posits that the basis for the EU’s power lies
in the size of the internal market, is one that has gained significant
traction in the field of external trade policy.117 Instead of being a
normative construct that is predisposed to act normatively, the EU
is an internal market predisposed to externalise its market norms.
The inclusion of standards in EU trade agreements is pinpointed by
Damro as the archetypal example of market power:
The externalization of internal regulatory measures can take place if, for
example, the EU attempts to include standards in bilateral and multilateral
trade agreements (i.e., positive conditionality). Even if the EU employs
the tools of positive conditionality with the intent of persuading changes
in behaviour, the third parties in question may feel they have been coerced
into changing their behaviour because they have no alternative: they must
agree to undesirable terms in trade agreements because they need access
to the large European single market; and they must abide by the EU’s
relevant internal regulatory measures or they will be subject to sanctioning
under the associated implementing legislation.118
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“Market Power Europe” presents the EU as an international
trade actor that uses the promise of market access or the threat of the
removal of such access as a coercive tool to influence the behaviour
of external actors, as opposed to “Normative Power Europe” where
influence is exerted through normative, non-coercive, means.
The EU’s current approach to negotiating DCFTAs,
however, does not fit neatly into either one of these
conceptualisations. On the one hand, a number of features typically
associated with Normative Power Europe can be found in the EU’s
regulatory agenda. First, the EU has consistently used its DCFTAs
to promote fundamental values such as respect of human rights and
the promotion of sustainable development objectives119. Second, as
previously discussed, the EU tends to shy away from using its
DCFTAs to export EU-specific rules and has opted instead to
promote international rules and standards. These agreements can
therefore be viewed as part of a wider attempt to promote and
consolidate existing international norms and institutions.120 Third,
whilst the EU’s trade agreements generally follow a pre-established
template, the EU has not been averse to differentiating between
trading partners depending on their particular circumstances and,
especially, their levels of economic development.121 Rather than
pursuing a one-size-fits-all policy, the EU has tended to adopt a
differentiated approach by imposing less onerous regulatory
disciplines and liberalisation requirements on some developing
country third parties.122 On the other hand, the EU’s regulatory
agenda also departs from “Normative Power Europe” in some
respects. Whilst the EU has a preference towards the dissemination
of international norms, it should be noted that these international
norms are fully incorporated into the EU acquis, and that the EU
does export EU-specific rules when this is considered to be in its
119
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Human Rights in EU External Trade Relations, 32 UTRECHT J. INT’L & EUR. L.
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interests.123 At a fundamental level, the Global Europe strategy and
the decision to focus on the negotiation of bilateral trade deals has
shown that the EU is ready to use the increased leverage it has in the
context of bilateral relations to push through the types of
commitments and reforms it could not secure at the multilateral
level. Even accounting for the EU’s willingness to differentiate
between trade partners, it cannot be ignored that many of the EU’s
developing country interlocutors rejected the EU’s demands for
higher standards of intellectual property protection, investment
protection or rules on competition within the framework of the
WTO. This is further reinforced by the EU’s recent foray into the
world of mega-regionals and its stated intent to use such agreements
to set international rules and standards. By using trade agreements
to circumvent opposition at the multilateral level, the EU positions
itself as a trade power that will readily make use of its economic
might to impose its agendas, irrespective of their potential impact
on others.124 There is thus an ongoing internal conflict which has
characterised the EU’s regulatory agenda, between the projection of
norms that reflect the EU’s regulatory preferences—in essence
market liberal norms which have been rejected at the multilateral
level—and the EU’s commitment to uphold certain values,
including to reflexively take into account the interest of third
countries and promote multilateral cooperation.
B. The International Investment Court—Rebirth of Normative
Power Europe?
This tension is aptly illustrated by the EU’s recent
experience in designing investment protection and investment
arbitration rules. International investment law, as it currently exists,
is a fragmented legal system populated mostly by bilateral
investment treaties (“BITs”), which regulate investment
liberalisation and protection and subject disputes to ISDS
123

See EU-Korea FTA, supra note 25, art. 15.3(1)(a) (discussing work
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infra (discussing the EU regulatory agenda).
124
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mechanisms. It is a field of law which has been increasingly
contested by developing countries because the rules included in
BITs are seen as highly skewed in favour of the protection of foreign
investments (typically originating from developed, capital exporting
countries) to the detriment of the rights of host states (typically
developing, capital importing countries) to regulate. For example,
the obligation to ensure fair and equitable treatment (FET), the most
important substantive standard included in BITs, requires host states
to refrain from adopting measures that would affect the legitimate
expectations that were taken into account by investors when the
decision to invest was made. Arbitral tribunals have identified
various benchmarks to determine the legitimate expectations of
foreign investors; from the status of the host state’s legal order at the
time when the investment was made, contractual arrangements
between the foreign investor and the host state or unilateral
representations made by the host State to the foreign investor.125
The expectations based on the regulatory environment of the host
State have proved to be problematic in that they have, on occasion,
been interpreted by arbitral tribunals as creating an obligation not to
modify the regulatory environment in a manner that would frustrate
such expectations.126 This has led to accusations that BITs result in
“regulatory chill”—that is, that they act as a disincentive for host
states to regulate for fear of falling foul of the agreements.127 The
ISDS system has also come in for severe criticism. There are
concerns regarding the perceived partiality of arbitrators who are
accused to have consistently promoted neo-liberalist and proinvestor interpretations of BITs,128 the lack of transparency of
125
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investment arbitration procedures as well as the inconsistent body
of case law which inevitably results from the multiplicity of ad hoc
arbitral tribunals.129
These concerns have led a number of countries to reconsider
their approach to international investment law. Large developed
economies like the US and Canada have re-drafted their Model BITs
with the aim to strike a more appropriate balance between the rights
of foreign investors and the rights of host states to regulate.130
Developing countries have also increasingly taken a leading role in
this recalibration of international investment law—one recent
example being India’s new Model BIT, which is so skewed in favour
of safeguarding the regulatory autonomy of host states, that it has
been described as an attempt by India to “immunize itself from
future BIT claims.”131 Some countries, such as Ecuador, have gone
further by contemplating exiting the sphere of international
investment law completely and terminating all of their BITs.132
The EU has tried to follow this general trend towards the
recalibration of international investment law by designing
investment protection chapters in its trade agreements which present
a number of distinctive features. Firstly, the EU has opted not to
adopt a Model BIT, but rather to adopt a flexible and differentiated
approach to negotiation of investment protection rules.133 The
European Commission explained this approach arguing that a “one129
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size-fits-all model for investment agreements . . . would necessarily
be neither feasible nor desirable” and that “. . . the level of
development of [the EU’s] partners should guide inter alia the
standards the Union sets in a specific investment negotiation.”134
The European Commission also specified that investment protection
rules “should also be guided by the principles and objectives of the
Union’s external action more generally, including the promotion of
the rule of law, human rights and sustainable development.”135
Furthermore, in a nod to the potential effect of international
investment law on the EU’s own regulatory autonomy, the European
Commission added that its approach to investment protection rules
had
to fit with the way the EU and its Member States regulate economic
activity within the Union and across our borders. Investment agreements
should be consistent with the other policies of the Union and its Member
States, including policies on the protection of the environment, decent
work, health and safety at work, consumer protection, cultural diversity,
development policy and competition policy.136

In short, from the outset, the EU signaled its intent to design
flexible investment protection rules and ISDS systems which
balanced investor protection interest against those of the host state
to regulate in pursuit of public interest objectives.
Initially, the reality fell some way short of these grand
designs. Whilst there were instances of innovation - notably
attempts to limit the scope of problematic investment protection
standards (e.g., FET, full security and protection and expropriation)
and the inclusion of additional procedural safeguards in the ISDS
mechanisms, the first EU trade agreements comprising investment
protection chapters (CETA and the EU-Singapore DCFTA) were
largely based on the texts of the US and Canadian Model BITs.137
The EU was, however, forced to reconsider its approach when it was
faced with a barrage of criticisms after initiating the negotiations of
134
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the EU-US TTIP, particularly relating to its plans to include an
investment chapter in the agreement.138 These criticisms eventually
led the European Commission to launch an online public
consultation exercise where it asked stakeholders to voice their
views on the EU’s proposed text for a TTIP investment protection
chapter (based on the text of the CETA).139 The response was
overwhelmingly negative with many contending that the text did not
go far enough in terms of securing the EU’s right to regulate and
that ISDS should be excluded from the TTIP altogether.140 The EU
responded, in turn, by publishing a “Concept Paper” proposing
further changes to its investment protection chapter in the TTIP that
would address the concerns domestically.141 With respect to
substantive standards, the changes proposed remained quite modest.
It was suggested that future trade agreements should include: (i) an
operational provision confirming the right of the parties to take
measures to achieve public interest objectives; and (ii) a provision
clarifying that the agreement would not affect the right of the parties
to discontinue or request the reimbursement of subsidies should
such subsidies be considered illegal.142 However, the Concept Paper
ushered a real departure from current international investment law
practice by putting forward a significant revamp of the ISDS
mechanism in its trade agreements by including innovative features
that were specifically intended to address the many flaws typically
138
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associated with ISDS and, more generally, international investment
law.143 This would include, for example, stringent rules on the
appointment of arbitrators, the possibility for the arbitral tribunals
to accept amicus curiae briefs and the establishment of appellate
mechanisms.144 Some of these proposals have since been
incorporated in EU trade agreements (CETA and EU-Vietnam
DCFTA) and are currently being discussed in the context of ongoing
negotiations (e.g., TTIP145). But by far the most transformative
suggestion made by the EU in the Concept Paper relates to the
possibility of creating a Multilateral Investment Court (“MIC”),
which would replicate many of the innovative features found in EU
trade agreements.146 The most important aspect of the proposal
concerns the idea of creating two levels of judicial controls whereby
rulings delivered in the first instance by an arbitral tribunal could be
subsequently reviewed by an appellate body. Such an appellate
mechanism would promote consistency in case law and improve the
predictability of investment arbitration rulings. The Concept Paper
also includes rules that would seek to ensure the independence and
impartiality of judges. Members of the tribunal or appellate body
are appointed for fixed terms, paid a fixed monthly retainer fee and
subject to strong ethical requirements that address potential conflicts
of interest.147 Additionally, the Paper includes rules intended to
enhance transparency (publication of documents and participation
rights for third parties148), to reduce procedural costs in order to
promote the use of the system by smaller economies and small and
medium sized enterprises,149 and to avoid abuses of procedure (e.g.,
parallel or manifestly unfounded claims150).
143
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The extent to which the EU’s proposals truly represent a
paradigm shift is the subject of some debate. Some commentators
have argued that the proposals merely recycle existing rules and
mechanisms and point to difficulties in ensuring a transition from a
BIT-dominated system to a permanent multilateral system.151
Others have taken a far more positive outlook by describing the
EU’s proposal as a “brave initiative and an innovative reform
blueprint for ISDS,”152 and commended the EU’s multilateral
approach as a “superior forum to investor-state arbitration.”153
Irrespective of the potential benefits or deficiencies of the EU’s
proposal for an MIC, it remains a significant attempt by the EU to
take a leadership role in the reform of international investment law
in a manner that is consistent with the idea of a Normative Power
Europe. From the outset, the EU has sought to design rules that take
into account its values, principles, objectives, and, in particular,
rules that would reflect the right of states to regulate in the public
interests.154 Further, the EU has been mindful of both its’ interest
and concerns and those of external actors. The EU’s proposal thus
addresses dissatisfaction with ISDS voiced not just domestically,
but also internationally. In this regard, it is significant that not only
do the EU’s proposals for a MIC address many of the broad
complaints aimed at ISDS, but they also put forward ideas that relate
specifically to developing country concerns, such as cost reduction
initiatives and special assistance for developing countries. It is also
significant that the EU has sought to develop its’ proposals in an
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inclusive manner155 To do this, the EU has used trade agreements to
incrementally promote and garner support for the MIC model. Thus,
the CETA and the EU-Vietnam DCFTA both replicate the dual
judiciary control system envisaged by the MIC and include a
commitment from the parties to enter into negotiations for the
establishment of the MIC. In the meantime, the investment court
proposal has been tabled by the EU in the context of the ongoing
TTIP and EU-China Investment Agreement negotiations.156 But
besides trade agreements, the EU (alongside Canada) has also
actively endeavoured to engage the wider international community
to in the project. The EU and Canada have co-sponsored intergovernmental meetings in Nairobi and Geneva, whether within the
framework of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD),157 the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”),158 and the World Economic
Forum (WEF)159 were even within margins of these organisations160
to gauge the appetite for the establishment of the MIC and to give
third countries an opportunity to shape and take ownership of the
proposals. This, again, bears the hallmarks of Normative Power
Europe. Not only is the EU seeking to project itself in a manner
155
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which seeks to take into account the considerations beyond its selfinterest—to do “least harm”161—it is doing so by both engaging with
external actors and by promoting dialogue and participation in
cooperative frameworks within existing international institutions.
V. CONCLUSION
Recent events have put the spotlight back on international
trade politics. The United Kingdom’s decision to leave the EU and
the results of the presidential elections in the US have been
presented in some quarters as a rejection of the liberal trade policies
of economic globalisation and, more generally, as part of a gnawing
sense on the part of certain segments of the electorate that
globalisation and the international legal structures that underpin it
have eroded national autonomy and democratic accountability.
These are the same concerns that have been fuelling the growing
contestation of the EU regulatory agenda.
As discussed in this Article, the EU regulatory agenda
pursues perfectly legitimate goals. The regulatory dimension of EU
DCFTAs is intended to address very real market access restrictions
which EU firms and exporters encounter when doing business
abroad.162 Promoting rules and standards abroad that reflect EU
regulatory preferences facilitates market access for EU firms abroad
and expands its normative sphere of influence. This proved fairly
uncontroversial while the EU negotiated DCFTAs that were
vehicles for the exportation of EU and international standards to
smaller economies. But the negotiation of more ambitious EU
DCFTAs with large trade powers has brought home questions
concerning the legitimacy of the regulatory agenda. Some of these
questions will find answers within the realm of EU law. The
recently delivered Opinion 2/15 confirmed that most of the
provisions included in the EU’s DCFTAs do fall within the scope of
the EU’s exclusive competence. In the future, we can also expect
challenges regarding other aspects of these DCFTAs, such as the
compatibility of ISDS mechanisms with EU law.
Other questions, however, will require some introspection
on the part of the EU and a careful examination of the type of
161
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measures that can be taken to recalibrate its regulatory agenda in a
manner that enhances its legitimacy domestically and abroad. In
this respect, the EU’s recent experience in designing the investment
protection chapters of its DCFTAs can be held up as a shining
example of the positives that can be derived from exposing the
regulatory components of its DCFTAs to a more broad-based
democratic debate. The EU’s decision to conduct an online public
consultation and its response to the criticisms levelled at its
investment protection chapters has led to the development of
genuinely innovative reform proposals which tackle many of the
flaws associated with international investment law system. A
similar approach should be followed in relation to the regulatory
cooperation chapters of these DCFTAs which, as things stand, lend
themselves to capture by special interest groups. More generally,
there is also a discussion to be had as to how best to achieve a
balance between the need to conduct an effective EU trade policy
and the need to garner broad democratic support for those DCFTAs
which delve into delicate regulatory issues. Here, despite the
exclusive nature of the EU’s trade competence, it may be worth
considering a constitutional reconfiguration in this field which
would enhance the role of national parliaments in the negotiation
process.
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